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BEYOND ECONOMICALLY TARGETED
INVESTMENTS: REDEFINING THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF PENSION FUND
INVESTMENTS IN LOW-TO-MODERATE
INCOME RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
Alec Sauchik*
The test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed
ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to
function.'
INTRODUCTION
The greatest reservoir of our nation's wealth, pension funds,
have long been recognized as a potential source of funds for eco-
nomic development. It proved extremely difficult, however, to de-
vise a strategy that while providing the influx of capital to various
social programs would also guarantee the safety of retirees' assets.
Economically targeted investing, an innovative approach based on
a concept that, at the time of its development, contradicted main-
stream investment ideology, in theory has overcome this poten-
tially insurmountable obstacle. From the beginning, though, this
promising yet controversial strategy has met with criticism, which,
perhaps more than any other factor, accounted for the fact that
economically targeted investments ("ETIs") have never gained
wide acceptance among pension fund trustees.
Economically targeted investments are most commonly defined
as investments designed to produce a competitive rate of return
commensurate with the risk, as well as to create collateral eco-
nomic benefits for a targeted geographic area, group of people, or
sector of the economy.2 Mindful of the significant economic im-
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.S., Brooklyn Col-
lege of the City University of New York, 1999. I would like to thank Professor
Michael T. Madison for his guidance in writing this Note. Many thanks to the editors
and staff of Volume XXVIII of the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their invaluable
assistance with this project. Thanks to my family and friends for their support in all
my endeavors.
1. F. ScoT-r FITZGERALD, THE CRACK-UP 69 (Edmund Wilson ed. 1956).
2. Economically Targeted Investments: Hearings on HR 1594 Before the Comm.
on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities, Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations,
104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter Testimony of Olena Berg] (prepared testimony of
Olena Berg, Assistant Secretary of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits).
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pact that pension fund investments can have on local development,
pension fund trustees find the general concept of investing in their
respective states and municipalities attractive.3 Thus, although the
goal of economic development is indeed wisely believed to be a
laudable one, the means of achieving it through economically
targeted investments by pension funds has always been the subject
of heated debate because of concerns that such investments would
constitute a wasting of pension assets and hence a violation of
trustees' fiduciary duties.4
As is often the case with issues related to pensions and retire-
ment benefits, the debate over the legality of economically
targeted investments has become extensively politicized. At stake
are the gigantic assets of the pension funds in the United States,
which in the year 2000 amounted to more than $8 trillion.5 Ac-
cording to Rich Ferlauto, Associate Director of Constituent Devel-
opment for the Center for Policy Alternatives, "The largest pool of
investment capital available for any type of economic development
stimulus now rests in the hands of pension funds .... "6 Taking into
account the sensitive nature of the topic, the propriety of investing
pension money in infrastructure, affordable housing, and inner-city
neighborhoods is understandably a controversial issue.7
The concept of ETIs has venerable roots;8 however, it was not
until the Clinton Administration (the "Administration") put it high
on its domestic policy agenda that ETIs attracted substantial atten-
3. Ken Silverstein, GAO Report: Economically Targeted Investments Perform
Well, PENSION MGMT., Aug. 1, 1995, at 7 (discussing a 1993 survey of 118 private and
public pension funds by the International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans, in-
dicating, among other things, that three quarters of the respondents agreed that eco-
nomically targeted investments would help the economy).
4. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of
Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 73, 83 (1980).
5. See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE Sys., FLOW OF FUNDS
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 76 tbl. L.119 (2000) [hereinafter FLOW OF
FUNDS]. This figure includes total assets of private defined benefit plans and defined
contribution plans (including 401(k) type plans, the Federal Employees Retirement
System Thrift Savings Plan, and state and local government employee retirement
funds). Id.
6. Carl Horowitz, Should Government Direct Pensions?, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY,
Aug. 15, 1994, at 1.
7. E.g., Rob Norton, Clinton's Dumbest Ideas; Some Bad Economic Ideas Were
Ventilated in the Republican Primaries, But Some of the Very Worst Belong to the In-
cumbent, FORTUNE, May 13, 1996, at 45 ("The next-dumbest idea of the Clinton Ad-
ministration may eventually turn out to be the 'economically targeted investment"').
8. Julie Bennett, Pension Funds Hit New Targets: Retirement Funds Are Making
Economic Development a Goal, PLANNING, Feb. 1995, at 4 (discussing the origin of
the concept of ETIs and the practical effect of the policy).
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tion.9 Former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, and Assistant Sec-
retary of Labor, Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
Olena Berg, actively promoted economically targeted investments,
taking their case to Congress on several occasions10 and establish-
ing, under the auspices of the Department of Labor, the Clearing-
house of Economically Targeted Investment Opportunities.1 This
activity resonated with liberal voters across the country who inten-
sified pressure on pension funds to assume a more proactive role in
developing affordable housing, funding real estate mortgages, and
providing venture capital for local businesses.1 2 In turn, these at-
tempts to exert pressure on pension fund trustees met with sharp
criticism from conservative legislators led by Representative Jim
Saxton (R-N.J.), who criticized the Administration for jeopardizing
the safety of private and public pension systems.' 3
It was in this context that the trustees of many pension funds in
the United States sighed with relief when in the summer of 1994
the Department of Labor released Interpretive Bulletin 94-1 ("the
Bulletin" or "I.B. 94-1"),14 specifically addressing the issue of ETIs.
The Bulletin, which was intended to clarify the Department's posi-
tion on the legality of ETIs,'5 in effect placed the Administration's
imprimatur on economically targeted investments. In the fall of
1995, however, the House of Representatives passed the Pension
Protection Act of 1995 ("H.R. 1594"), prohibiting the Administra-
tion from promoting economically targeted investments and void-
ing I.B. 94-1.16 Although the companion resolution died in the
9. Id.
10. Testimony of Olena Berg, supra note 2; Targeted Pension Fund Investment.
Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 103rd Cong (1994) (testimony of Robert B.
Reich, Secretary of Labor), reprinted in FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONG.
TESTIMONY (June 22, 1994) [hereinafter Testimony of Robert Reich] ("We will en-
courage funds to reach for.., collateral benefits, because - far from conflicting with
their fiduciary duties - doing so complements their responsibilities to plan
participants.").
11. See Testimony of Olena Berg, supra note 2.
12. E.g., Jinny St Goar, Your Own Backyard, PLAN SPONSOR, Apr. 1994 ("Pres-
sures are building.., for pension sponsors to devote more of their attention-if not
their portfolios-to locally linked assets."), http://www.assetpub.com/archive/ps/94-
04psapril/april94PS44.html.
13. Jim Saxton, Dipping into Private Pensions, J. OF COM., Dec. 29, 1995, at 6A.
14. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (2001).
15. Bernard F. O'Hare & Timothy J. Klapak, Economically Targeted Investments
Remain Rare, N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1995, at 7 (discussing the implications of Interpretive
Bulletin 94-1).
16. H.R. 1594, 104th Cong. (1995) ("It is the sense of the Congress that it is inap-
propriate for the Department of Labor... to take any action to promote or otherwise
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Senate,17 H.R. 1594 succeeded in effectively nullifying whatever
successes the Administration had achieved in popularizing ETIs.
Conservative organizations and the media immediately re-
sponded to Congress' shift in attitude toward ETIs. The Institute
for Policy Innovation and the Lexington Institute, for example,
named Interpretive Bulletin 94-1 one of the ten worst regulations
requiring immediate repeal or correction by the 1 0 7 th Congress. 8
As often occurs in the realm of public policy, what many once con-
sidered an ingenious solution to a number of social challenges
ranging from homelessness to unemployment has become synony-
mous with the worst-case abuse by Washington's "regulatory mon-
ster." Once the subject of national attention,' 9 the topic of
economically targeted investment programs has since acquired a
negative connotation.2 °
Setting politics aside, two basic issues are at the heart of the de-
bate over economically targeted investments: first, whether such
investments represent sensible economic and social policy; second,
whether ETIs are consistent with the fiduciary obligations of pen-
sion fund trustees. 2' Supporters of ETIs advocate using pension
money as a source of funds for affordable housing, venture capital,
encourage economically targeted investments .... Interpretive Bulletin 94-1 ... is
null and void and shall have no force or effect.").
17. S. Res. 774, 104th Cong. (1995). The sponsor of S. 774, Senator Connie Mack
(R-Fla.), presenting the bill to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources, said that "[t]hese economically targeted investments (ETI's) would use pen-
sion funds to pay for Government programs. This nice-sounding term is merely a
disguise for the systematic raiding of our pension funds." 141 CONG. REC. S. 6352
(1995). The resolution was reintroduced on June 11, 1997 as part of the Retirement
Income, Security and Savings Act of 1997, S. 883, 105th Cong. (1997).
18. Merrick Carey, America's Worst Regulations, J. OF COM., Mar. 11, 1999, at 5A
(maintaining that the Department of Labor regulation in effect permits pension funds
to engage in social investing, which results in returns on average two percent lower
than prevailing rates).
19. See Charles Ruffel, Faster Growth Ahead, PLAN SPONSOR, May 1996 (analyz-
ing a trend toward increase in the number of alternative investments by pension
funds, including economically targeted investments), http://www.assetpub.com/
archive/ps/96-05psmay/may96PS48.html.
20. D. Jeanne Patterson, Disappearing ETIs, or Just a New Definition? PENSION &
INVESTMENTS, June 10, 1996, at 18.
21. Compare Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Protecting Retirees while Encouraging Ec-
onomically Targeted Investments, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 47 (1996) [hereinafter
Protecting Retirees] ("The ongoing debate over economically targeted investments is
primarily about power and politics and only secondarily about pensions."), with Ed-
ward A. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted In-
vestments, I.B. 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy; Interpretive Bulletin 94-
1, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 333, 336 (1995) [hereinafter Phone the Department
of Labor] ("The ETI concept is unsound as a matter of policy and logic ....").
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infrastructure, and job creation by putting money in geographical
areas and sectors of the economy overlooked by other investors.22
Opponents of economically targeted investments typically point to
the lack of empirical data supporting the economic theories under-
lying the concept of ETIs,23 potential political pressures on pension
fund sponsors to engage in this type of investments,24 and the per-
ceived lack of accountability of trustees engaging in the abuse-
prone activity of using pensions for public purposes.25 Critics also
argue that targeted investments often produce lower returns com-
pared to non-targeted investments.26 Invariably, however, critics
tie these arguments to the larger question of the consistency of
ETIs with fiduciary obligations of pension fund trustees.2 7
This Note contrasts two conflicting views on the legality of eco-
nomically targeted investments. Examining the concept of ETI
from the perspective of targeted investments in low-to-moderate
income residential real estate, the Note identifies various short-
comings of the traditional ETI model. The Note demonstrates how
recent developments in pension fund fiduciary laws can revive the
interest of pension fund trustees in targeted investments in low-to-
moderate income residential real estate, and proposes several pol-
icy approaches aimed at increasing pension fund investments in
this sector.
22. Testimony of Olena Berg, supra note 2.
23. Edward A. Zelinsky, Economically Targeted Investments: A Critical Analysis, 6
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 39, 41 (1997) [hereinafter Critical Analysis] (maintaining
that economically targeted investments at best accomplish minimal returns, and are
likely to deliver below-market risk-adjusted returns).
24. Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Re-
considered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 801-04 (1993).
25. See Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21, at 351 (suggesting that
fund trustees will declare proposed ETIs economically competitive when there is no
functioning market to test that declaration: "Historical experience with ETIs further
counsels that, once the door is opened to consideration of collateral benefits, such
concerns crowd out basic financial criteria.").
26. See John R. Nofsinger, Why Targeted Investing Does Not Make Sense!, FIN.
MGMT., Sept. 22, 1998 (analyzing the returns of pension plans with and without ETIs
and concluding that ETIs earn lower returns after adjusting for risk). But see Jun
Han, Targeting Markets is Popular: A Survey of Pension Real Estate Investment Advi-
sors, REAL EST. FIN., Spring 1996, at 66-67 ("There are some obvious benefits associ-
ated with targeting geographic markets .... It may enhance performance.").
27. See Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21, at 342; see generally Alvin
D. Lurie, ETIs: A Scheme for the Rescue of the City and Country with Pension Funds,
5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 315, 333-37 (1996) (arguing for the creation of a new
legal paradigm for governing pension funds which would avoid the perceived conflict
with the fiduciary duties); Thomas M. Griffin, Note, Investing Labor Union Pension
Funds in Workers: How ERISA and the Common Law Trust May Benefit Labor by
Economically Targeting Investment, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 11 (1998).
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Part I presents the socioeconomic theory underlying the concept
of ETIs and outlines the scope of trustees' fiduciary obligations to
plan participants when making investments in residential real es-
tate. This Part also analyzes relevant case law pertaining to fiduci-
ary duties of pension fund trustees. Part II compares two
conflicting views on the legality of economically targeted invest-
ments. Part III argues that although the legal framework applica-
ble to the fiduciary obligations of pension fund trustees is
inadequate to fully address all challenges to the legality of ETIs,
pension fund investments in low-to-moderate income residential
real estate can be reconciled with the duties of plan fiduciaries to
plan participants and their beneficiaries. It examines several po-
tential strategies aimed at popularizing targeted pension invest-
ments in low and moderate income residential real estate. This
Note concludes that targeted investments in low and moderate in-
come residential real estate are a valid social objective that pension
funds can and should cautiously pursue.
I. ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INVESTMENTS IN LOW-TO-
MODERATE INCOME RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE
Although the subject of economically targeted investments has
been publicized widely, this subject still creates significant confu-
sion for pension fund trustees. 28 This Part discusses socioeconomic
and legal issues relevant to economically targeted investments in
low-to-moderate income residential real estate. First, it demon-
strates the critical need for non-traditional sources of affordable
housing financing. Second, it analyzes pension fund investments in
various real estate vehicles, and examines pension funds as the
source for financing low-to-moderate income residential real es-
tate. Third, it summarizes the fiduciary obligations of pension fund
trustees when making real estate investments.
A. Affordable Housing
The need for affordable housing in the United States is at a re-
cord high. According to the latest report from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 5.3 million low-income Ameri-
28. Phil Levine, Where There's a Will, There's ETI, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS,
Nov. 10, 1997, at 52; see also Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 54 (quoting Hearing
on Pension Investments and Econ. Growth Before the Joint Econ. Comm. on Economi-
cally Targeted Investments, 103d Cong. (1994) (testimony of Lee Smith, Executive Di-
rector of Excelsior Capital Corporation), reprinted in FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING
HOUSE CONG. TESTIMONY (June 22, 1994)) [hereinafter Testimony of Lee Smith].
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cans now suffer "worst case housing needs," paying more than fifty
percent of their gross income for rent or living in severely substan-
dard housing.29 The dramatic increase in rent prices in the 1990s,
particularly in large cities,3° led to a housing shortage of unprece-
dented proportions, with the fastest growth in worst-case house-
holds among working families, which increased twenty-four
percent between 1991 and 1995.31 Although home ownership rates
are at an all-time high,32 affordable housing is scarcer than ever,
with five million families paying half their income in rent.33
According to the report, the crisis is attributable in part to the
continuing decline in the affordable housing stock over the past
twenty years.34  Between 1993 and 1995 alone, approximately
900,000 units affordable to low-income families were lost.35 The
report also indicates that while the demand for affordable housing
is at a record high, federal support for new housing is decreasing. 36
Substantial cuts to federal housing programs resulted in the back-
log in forty cities of approximately one million families on waiting
lists for public housing or rent subsidies.37 State and local afforda-
ble housing programs also suffer from a severe and persistent
shortage of funds, and cannot effectively meet affordable housing
needs at the local level. 38 The policy of privatizing the delivery of
affordable housing has yet to produce the desired effect. 39 As the
federal and state governments cannot effectively address the prob-
lem of affordable housing, the need for alternative sources of af-
fordable housing financing is all too obvious.
29. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., WAITING IN VAIN: AN UPDATE ON
AMERICA'S RENTAL HOUSING CRISIS 1 (1999) [hereinafter WAITING IN VAIN].
30. See, e.g., Bruce Lambert, Housing Crisis Confounds a Prosperous City; In New
York, Scarcity and High Costs Spur Competing Ideas for a Solution, N.Y. TIMES, July
9, 2000, at 23.
31. WAITING IN VAIN, supra note 29, at 2.
32. Thomas G. Scott, Home Ownership Rate Reaches Record High, Bus. J., Sept.
1, 2000, at 58.
33. See WAITING IN VAIN, supra note 29.
34. Id. at 15-16.
35. Id. at 15.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id.; see also Randy Shaw, There's No Place Like Home; Yet Washington Ig-
nores the National Housing Crisis, IN THESE TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at 24; Marjory
Valburn, Housing is Missing in U.S. Campaign, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2000, at
8.
38. See generally Harold A. McDougall, Affordable Housing for the 1990's, 20 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 727 (1987); see also Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low
Income Housing Assistance: The Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 878
(1990) (discussing various issues related to privatization of affordable housing).
39. See generally Schill, supra note 38.
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B. Pension Funds as the Source of Funds for Affordable
Housing Investments
In 2000, pension funds in the United States collectively held ap-
proximately $8 trillion.40 Approximately $5 trillion was attributa-
ble to private pension funds.41 The assets of defined contribution
plans,42 which are the fastest growing category of pension funds,
reached $2.1 trillion in 1999, up 26.7% from a year ago.43 Each
year, pension plans allocate on average more than $100 billion in
new investments. 4
Historically, pension funds have been conservative investors.45
Until recently, almost all pension investments were in stocks and
fixed income instruments.4 6 The passage of the Employment Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), as amended,47
significantly altered the way pension plans allocated funds to vari-
ous investment classes. ERISA required that pension plans diver-
sify their investments beyond the typical mixture of stocks and
fixed-income securities. The purpose of the diversification require-
ment was to bring pension fund portfolios in line with modern in-
vestment guidelines.48
40. FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 5.
41. Id. tbl. L.119.
42. A defined contribution plan is a plan that provides for an individual account
for each participant and for benefits based solely on the amount contributed to the
participant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeitures
of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant's account.
I.R.C. § 414(i) (2001).
43. Christine Williamson, Slight Bump: Managers' Assets Barely Rise in 1999; Still,
Tax-Exempt Funds Top .$7 Trillion, PENSIONS AND INVESTMENTS, May 1, 2000, at 1.
44. FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 5, at 31 tbls. F.119 & F.120.
45. E.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Conversations from The Warren Buffett Sym-
posium, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 719, 733 (1997).
46. Thomas G. Donlan, Public Funds Can Be Their Own Worst Enemies, BAR-
RON'S, Oct. 3, 1994, at 53 (discussing the evolution of pension fund investment strate-
gies from relatively unsophisticated to highly complex).
47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1467 (1999).
48. ERISA was enacted in response to a variety of weaknesses in the pension
system. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russel, 473 U.S. 134, 140 n.8 (1985). The
statute addressed such problems as unrealistically lengthy periods of participation,
penalties for short periods of unemployment, and inadequacy of pension assets to
cover liabilities to plan participants, among others. E.g., Parker v. BankAmerica
Corp., 50 F.3d 757, 765 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting the twofold policy of ERISA: to pro-
tect employees from economic hardship of joblessness and to reward employees for
past service to companies); Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431
F. Supp. 271, 275-76 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (noting that it is reasonable to assume that Con-
gress, in passing ERISA, intended to protect pension plan participants from agree-
ments to arbitrate or similar agreements, often unilaterally imposed, which "snip and
whittle" at federally protected rights). ERISA also was intended to eliminate impru-
1930
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In response to the enactment of ERISA, asset classes other than
traditional equity and fixed-income securities emerged as indispen-
sable components of pension fund portfolios. ERISA integrated
the basic principles of the "Modern Portfolio Theory" ("MPT"),49
which suggests that a truly diversified portfolio needs to hold in-
vestments in all industry segments that comprise a nation's
wealth.50 To achieve risk-return characteristics recommended by
the MPT, pension trustees significantly reorganized their plans'
portfolios. 51 Various non-traditional asset classes, such as junk
bonds and venture capital funds, have become common compo-
nents of pension fund portfolios.52 As part of this trend, real estate
emerged as one of the most widely held types of pension fund in-
vestments. 53 Investment consultants today recommend that pen-
sion funds allocate from five to fifteen percent of their portfolios to
dent and dishonest investment practices by pension plan trustees. Pompano v.
Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc. 680 F.2d 911, 914-15 (2d Cir. 1982) (maintaining that
the purpose of ERISA was to secure guaranteed pension payments to participants by
ensuring honest administration of financially sound plans). The initiatives built into
ERISA to prevent such practices included funding standards, reporting and disclosure
requirements, plan termination insurance, and minimum coverage requirements. 29
U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1999); see also Statement of Professor John H. Langbein, Yale Law
School, Reforming ERISA Investment Law, Feb. 2000, reprinted in FED. DOCUMENT
CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TESTIMONY (Feb. 15, 2000).
49. "Modern Portfolio Theory" is the term often used to describe several theories
about the nature of modern markets and the investment of financial assets. EDWIN J.
ELTON & MARTIN J. GRUBER, MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT
ANALYSIS (1981); see generally Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77
(1952). To most people, Modern Portfolio Theory means essentially investing with an
eye on the portfolio's overall return following the strategy of risk minimization
through diversification. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing
and the Law of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 93-94 (1980).
50. Robert L. Johnson, Jr. & Peter R. Shepard, Defined Contribution Pension
Plans: Can the Real Estate Industry Tap This Growing Pool of Capital?, REAL EST.
REV., Spring 1997, at 6.
51. Terry Williams, ERISA Changed Investment Landscape Forever, PENSIONS
AND INVESTMENTS, Sept. 6, 1999, at 20.
52. E.g., N.Y. STATE AND LOCAL RET. Sys., 2000 ANN. REP., INVESTMENT SEC-
TION (2000) (describing portfolio composition and enumerating investments of the
New York State Common Retirement Fund), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/
retire/annrep00/00artoc.htm
53. As of September 15, 2000, domestic pension funds held $141.9 billion, or
37.5% of the total institutional investments in the domestic real estate equity, and
$36.4 billion, or 2.3% of the total investments in the domestic real estate debt. LEND
LEASE REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, EMERGING
TRENDS IN REAL ESTATE 2001 27 Exhibit 3-2 (2001) [hereinafter EMERGING TRENDS
2001].
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real estate,54 with some studies estimating the optimum real estate
allocation percentage in the twelve to twenty percent range.55
However, current levels of real estate allocations by pension
funds fall short of these recommendations. 51 In 1995, defined ben-
efit pension funds5 7 allocated on average 4.5% of their portfolio to
real estate. 58 Although U.S. pension funds invested $135.4 billion
in real estate equity,5 9 and $37.6 billion in real estate debt in 2000,60
these figures are still far below the allocation levels that many ex-
perts recommend. 61 Although pension funds have been increasing
their real estate investment programs,62 experts agree that under-
investment in real estate is a serious issue facing pension funds.63
Several disadvantages of real estate contribute to pension fund's
insufficient level of investments in this sector of the economy. The
main disadvantage of real estate is the lack of liquidity associated
with shares in a real estate investment.64 Proper valuation of real
estate assets can also present significant challenges.65 In addition,
because the underlying real estate assets are immobile, the value of
real estate investments is more sensitive to changes in local supply-
and-demand conditions than the value of common stock invest-
ments, which tend to be affected by national supply-and-demand
conditions.66 The ownership of income-producing real estate may
involve significant management functions;6 7 however, the cost of
greater managerial control is higher operating fees.68 Furthermore,
54. Johnson & Shepard, supra note 50, at 7.
55. E.g., Gregory H. Chun et al., Pension-Plan Real Estate Investment in an Asset-
Liability Framework, REAL EST. ECON., Oct. 1, 2000, at 467 (reviewing procedures
used in estimating the optimal allocation to real estate in a pension-fund portfolio).
56. Id.
57. The Internal Revenue Code defines defined benefit plan as a plan other than a
plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits
based solely on the amount contributed to the participant's account, and any income,
expense, gains and loses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which
may be allocated to such participant's account. I.R.C. § 414(j) (2001).
58. Johnson & Shepard, supra note 50, at 7.
59. FLOW OF FUNDS, supra note 5, at 31 tbls. F.119, F.120
60. See id.
61. Public Pension Funds Seen as Big Buyers, REAL EST. ALERT, Mar. 6, 2000, at
1.
62. Johnson & Shepard, supra note 50, at 10.
63. Id. at 9.
64. MICHAEL T. MADISON ET AL., MODERN REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND LAND
TRANSFER: A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 781 (2d ed. 1999).
65. Id. at 657-60.
66. Johnson & Shepard, supra note 50, at 10.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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because pension funds are generally tax-exempt entities,69 owner-
ship and operation of income-producing real estate may result in
undesirable tax consequences like unrelated business taxable in-
come ("UBTI").70
Despite the low liquidity of its underlying assets and the diffi-
culty of its valuation, real estate is a financially attractive invest-
ment.7' Institutional investors like pension funds can realize high
rates of return on equity or debt real estate investments, in many
cases exceeding typical returns of fixed-income securities.72 A
number of studies have demonstrated that real estate returns ex-
hibit less volatility than corporate equities or bonds, and that their
returns are partially "hedged" during periods of high inflation.73
This characteristic of real estate as an effective hedge against infla-
tion makes this asset class an effective tool in controlling the over-
all long-term performance of a pension fund portfolio.74
Recognizing the advantages of real estate and its significance for
the nation's capital markets, pension funds consider it an important
long-term asset class.75 Typically, private pension funds and state
retirement systems invest in real estate on the equity (stock) and
69. I.R.C. § 501(c)(22) (2001).
70. Dorothy Walton, Tax Law Lends Relief for Real Estate Investment; Revenue
Reconciliation Act of 1993, J. OF PROP. MGMT., Jan. 1994, at 62 (observing that poten-
tial sources of UBTI include rents and gains from real estate that has been acquired
for debt).
71. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. o (1992) ("There may be
good reasons for a particular trust to hold equity positions in real estate, provided the
particular investment or investment program fits the circumstances and purposes of
the trust and can otherwise be handled in a prudent manner.").
72. EMERGING TRENDS 2001, supra note 53 at 18 Exhibit 2-3 (rating asset class
investment potential for 2001); see also G. Andrews Smith, Real Estate Resurgence
Expected, But No Bell Will Alert Investors, PENSION WORLD, Feb. 1992, at 46 (sum-
marizing the findings of a comparison study prepared by Evaluation Associates Inc.,
Norwalk, Conn., indicating that real estate outperformed stocks in eight of the twenty
years beginning December 30, 1970, and outperformed bonds in ten years out of
twenty).
73. See generally MADISON, supra note 64 at 662 (citing Joseph Gyourko & J.
Siegel, Long-Term Return Characteristics of Income-Producing Real Estate, REAL
EST. FIN. J., Spring 1994, at 14).
74. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 cmt. o (1992) ("Because of
its importance as a part of the country's capital markets, real estate is a potentially
valuable ingredient of a diversification strategy, especially in light of its limited covari-
ance with publicly traded equity and debt securities .... [W]ith thoughtful selection
of properties or structuring of ownership positions, a trustee can organize the ele-
ments of the return toward the enhancement of either income productivity or princi-
pal appreciation, as might be desired for a particular trust portfolio.").
75. Andrew L. Gaines & Robert G. Koen, Pension Fund Investments in Real Es-
tate: Broad Opportunities, Important Limitations, REAL EST. FIN. J., Summer 2000, at
7.
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on the debt (bond) sides. 76 Depending on the fund's strategy and
needs, pension fund trustees typically consider a number of factors
in establishing real estate investment guidelines. These factors in-
fluence selection of the types of investments and ownership vehi-
cles.77 Pension funds can choose one or more of the following real
estate equity investment vehicles: separate account or commingled
fund; public and/or private investment; title holding corporation;
group trust; limited liability company; limited or general partner-
ship; or joint venture.78 Pension funds also invest in various debt
instruments secured by real estate, such as individual and pooled
mortgages.
The advancement of securitization has revolutionized the pro-
cess of real estate investing. 79 Real estate investment trusts
("REITs") on the equity side and mortgage-backed securities
("MBSs") on the debt side have addressed such problems associ-
ated with the ownership of real estate assets as low liquidity and
difficulties in valuation.80 REITs and MBSs allow investors to par-
ticipate in the real estate market without exposure to disadvan-
tages associated with more traditional forms of real estate
ownership.81
C. Economically Targeted Investments
In formulating investment guidelines, pension fund trustees take
into consideration many factors related to the fund's purpose of
providing guaranteed retirement benefits to plan participants.82
The primary characteristic governing the selection of plan invest-
ments is a risk-adjusted rate of return.83 Retirement systems plan
in advance for their obligations and payouts to plan participants,
and adjust portfolio allocations for liquidity.84 Proper diversifica-
76. See EMERGING TRENDS 2001, supra note 53.
77. Johnson & Shepard, supra note 50, at 12.
78. See generally MADISON, supra note 64, at 757-75 (discussing various factors
relevant to the selection of real estate ownership vehicles).
79. Id.
80. Johnson & Shepard, supra note 50, at 10, 14; see also Joseph Philip Forte, Capi-
tal Markets Mortgage: A Ratable Model for Main Street and Wall Street, 31 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 489, 514 (1996).
81. See generally MADISON, supra note 64, at 781-85.
82. Stanley L. Iezman, Complying With ERISA: A Primer for Pension Plan Trust-
ees, REAL EST. REV., Spring 1997, at 19.
83. Johnson & Shepard, supra note 50, at 12.
84. Id.
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tion of a plan's assets is also an important consideration for pen-
815sion fund managers.
Pension funds have long recognized that, in addition to financial
returns, pension investments often generate desirable collateral
benefits.86 Depending on the type and structure of the invest-
ments, the benefits may include job creation, increased housing
stock, and community and business development.87 A pension
fund trustee can choose to invest in local projects to produce desir-
able developmental effect for the states and municipalities where
the plan is located. Positive attention from taxpayers supplements
the amount of collateral gains a pension fund ultimately receives
from such endeavors.
Although the strategy of local investing is of old vintage,88 with a
few notable exceptions" pension funds have only recently begun
establishing investment programs specifically targeting particular
sectors of the economy or a geographical locality. The Clinton Ad-
ministration was instrumental in popularizing this strategy later
branded economically targeted investing.9" Gradually, the pension
fund community has become more interested in developmental in-
vesting, with as many as forty-five out of the 119 largest public pen-
sion funds participating in ETIs by 1993.91 Yet despite the
Administration's promotion and a strong message by the Depart-
ment of Labor in the form of Interpretive Bulletin 94-1, allocations
to ETIs remained negligible.92 In fact, at the peak of the interest in
85. Id.
86. E.g., Pension Investments and Economic Growth, Testimony Before the Joint
Econ. Comm., 103rd Cong. (1994) (testimony of Dr. William Dale Crist, President,
California Public Employees' Retirement System, Board of Administration), re-
printed in FED. DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONG. TESTIMONY (June 22, 1994)
("[I]t is not just acceptable to consider what are referred to as the collateral economic
benefits of any investment, it would be imprudent not to include such considerations
in the investment decision making process."); see also Testimony of Robert Reich,
supra note 10 ("Pension funds.., are positioned like no other force in the American
economy to raise incomes and spark new jobs.")
87. Testimony of Olena Berg, supra note 2.
88. Bennett, supra note 8.
89. E.g., Neal R. Pierce & Jerry Hagstrom, Unions, Frostbelt Seek More Control
Over Pension Fund Investments, NAT'L J., Jan. 27, 1979, at 145 (indicating that as of
1979 a number of unions had been experimenting with alternative investment strate-
gies, including targeted investments).
90. See Patterson, supra note 20, at 18.
91. Joel Chernoff & Christine Philip, Pension Funds Under Pressure; Push for
Targeted Investments Increases Under Clinton, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Feb. 22,
1993, at 1.
92. Patterson, supra note 20, at 18.
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ETIs, private pension funds almost universally avoided them.93 As
the attacks on the legality of ETIs intensified, culminating with
H.R. 1594,94 pension fund trustees' interest in this type of invest-
ment declined.95 Although in 1995 as few as twenty of the largest
public retirement systems held almost $30 billion invested in vari-
ous ETI programs,96 this figure has since significantly declined,
with the proportion of ETIs to other pension fund allocations con-
tinuously decreasing. 97
D. Fiduciary Obligations of Pension Fund Trustees and
. Other Fiduciaries.98
The reluctance of pension fund trustees to allocate funds to eco-
nomically targeted investments is attributable, at least in part, to
the uncertainty over the consistency of such investments with the
fiduciary obligations of pension fund trustees.99 The purpose of
pension funds is to provide safe retirement income to plan partici-
pants.100 To ensure the safety of a plan's assets, pension fund fidu-
ciaries must follow the appropriate standards of care.1°1
Various laws governing fiduciary obligations of pension plan fi-
duciaries stem from principles embedded in the common law of
93. Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21, at 350.
94. H.R. 1594, 104th Cong. (1995)
95. Patterson, supra note 20, at 18.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. ERISA recognizes that in certain circumstances, a person who renders
investment advice or other services to a plan, or who has the authority or
responsibility to do so, is a plan fiduciary. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (1999);
Interpretive Bulletins Relating to Participant Investment Education, 29 C.F.R.
§ 2509.96-1 (1999).
99. According to the 1993 survey of the 119 largest public pension funds by the
Institute for Fiduciary Education, thirty-seven percent of respondents reported that
the principal reason why they did not invest in economically targeted investments was
because of the perceived conflicts with fiduciary duties; eleven percent referred to
concerns over disproportionate amount of staff time required for such investments;
eleven percent said that ETIs were not statutorily authorized; eight percent said that
they did not invest in ETIs because "no one asked us to invest in an ETI"; four per-
cent said their legal counsel had advised against ETIs; and four percent said they
perceived no need for ETIs. Only 45 of the 119 funds invested in ETIs. INST. FOR
FIDUCIARY EDU., ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INVESTMENTS, A REFERENCE FOR
PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS B-2 tbl. B-8 (1992) ; see also Protecting Retirees, supra note
21, at 53.
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(a) (1999).
101. For a broad-spectrum discussion of the fiduciary obligations of pension fund
trustees under ERISA, see JACOB FRIEDMAN ET AL., THE PENSION ANSWER BOOK:
SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT, FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ERISA (1993).
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trusts. 0 2 Such principles of fiduciary obligations have historically
served to limit the conduct of plan fiduciaries in making invest-
ments.1 °3 At common law, pension fund sponsors owe plan partici-
pants the duty of loyalty and prudence. 10 4 Governed by these
standards, pension fund sponsors may not use institutional assets to
foster purposes other than the financial good of the parties toward
whom fiduciary duties run.10 5 Additionally, prior to the enactment
of ERISA, prototypes for its fiduciary care standards were also
evolving under the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code"), which
sets forth rules that pension funds, in order to maintain their tax-
exempt status, must follow in making investments.'0 6
102. Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc. 522 F.
Supp. 658, 665 (E.D. Mich. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 698 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 559 (1985) ("ERISA legislative history indicates that
the Congressional drafters refrained from delineating a precise list of powers and du-
ties to be undertaken by fiduciaries, but rather intended that fiduciaries be governed
by the principles applicable to the common law of trusts.").
103. E.g., Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446, 461 (1830).
[A]II that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct
himself faithfully and exercise a sound discretion. He is to observe how men
of prudence, discretion and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in re-
gard to speculation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their
funds, considering the probable income, as well as the probable safety of the
capital to be invested.
Id. This case established the Prudent Man Standard. Id.
104. E.g., Pickering v. El Jay Equip. Co., 700 P.2d 134, 140 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985)
(discussing common law duty of loyalty); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 227 cmt. c (1992) (describing the general requirements of loyalty and impartiality).
105. E.g., Blankenship v. Boyle, 329 F. Supp. 1089 (D.D.C. 1971) (holding that the
fiduciaries of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare & Retirement Fund were
liable for damages caused by keeping large sums of cash with the National Bank of
Washington on a no-interest basis).
106. The Internal Revenue Code states that to qualify for a tax-exempt status, the
trust instrument under a pension plan must make it
impossible, at any time prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities with respect
to employees and their beneficiaries under the trust, for any part of the
corpus or income to be (within the taxable year or thereafter) used for, or
diverted to, purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of [the employer's]
employees or their beneficiaries.
I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (2001).
Additionally, the exclusive benefit rule applies to investments, and requires that the
investment meet the following criteria:
(1) the cost must not exceed fair market value at time of purchase;
(2) a fair return commensurate with the prevailing rate must be provided;
(3) sufficient liquidity must be maintained to permit distributions in accor-
dance with the terms of the plan; and
(4) the safeguards and diversity that a prudent investor would adhere to
must be present.
Rev. Rul. 69-494, 1969-2 C.B. 88 (1969). The Internal Revenue Code later extended
the standard set forth in Rev. Rul. 69-494 to all investments of a pension trust. Rev.
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Although the common law of trusts currently applies only to pri-
vate trusts,'0 7 ERISA regulates private pension funds and Taft-
Hartley union funds.108 In drafting ERISA, Congress refrained
from precisely defining the fiduciary duties of plan fiduciaries,
viewing basic principles of fiduciary care as codification of princi-
ples developed and applied in the common law of trusts.10 9 Con-
gress, however, explicitly ordered courts to interpret these
fiduciary standards "bearing in mind the special nature and pur-
pose of employee benefit plans."11  Furthermore, Congress
adopted the I.R.S. guidelines for determining whether fiduciaries
were acting for the exclusive benefit of the participants as the core
of the new fiduciary standards, so that, to the extent that a fiduci-
ary meets the prudent man rule of ERISA, he is deemed to meet
the exclusive benefit requirements of the Code. " '
1. ERISA
ERISA establishes fiduciary duties for private pension fund fidu-
ciaries, and the rules under which investments are allowed.11 2 It
applies to any pension fund maintained by an employer or union
that affects interstate commerce, other than: (1) a government
plan; (2) a church plan; (3) a plan maintained outside of the United
States primarily for the benefit of nonresident aliens; or (4) an un-
founded excess benefit plan.' 3 ERISA requires that a plan fiduci-
ary discharge his duties with respect to an employee benefit plan
solely in the interest of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. 14
For private pension funds, the primary sections relevant to eco-
nomically targeted investments are Section 404 (loyalty and pru-
dence)," 5 and Section 408 (diversification)" 6 of ERISA.
Proc. 72-6, 1972-1 C.B. 710 (1972) (superceded by Rev. Proc. 80-30, 1980-1 C.B. 685
(1980)).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1.003 (1999) (excluding governmental plans from coverage under
ERISA).
108. A "Taft-Hartley Plan" is a pension plan funded solely by employer contribu-
tions pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with a union and is subject to the
provisions of the Labor-Management Relations ("Taft-Hartley") Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1999 & Supp. 2000).
109. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-127, at 4 (1975).
110. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974-3 C.B. 415, 463.
111. Id.
112. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1999) (setting forth Congressional findings and
declaration of policy).
113. Id. § 1003(a) (enumerating the types of covered employee benefit plans).
114. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (codifying the Exclusive Benefit Rule).
115. Id. § 1104 (establishing the fiduciary obligations of plan fiduciaries).
116. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (establishing the portfolio diversification requirement).
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In analyzing a potential investment, a plan sponsor's fiduciary
duties require her to consider (a) whether the investment is pru-
dent within the meaning of Section 404, and (b) whether the invest-
ment complies with the Exclusive Benefit Rule.'17 Furthermore,
the investment must not be one of the prohibited transactions,"-'
and must not lead to inadequate diversification of the plan's
portfolio."19
a. The Prudence Requirement
Pension plan investments must satisfy the prudence requirement
of ERISA.120 In discharging her duties with respect to plan invest-
ments, a plan fiduciary must act "with the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent
man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like
aims. '121 The prudence requirement of Section 404 of ERISA is
flexible, taking into consideration the "character and aims" of the
fund served by a fiduciary in evaluating the adequacy of the fiduci-
ary's independent investigation and ultimate investment
selection. 12
2
Trustees and other fiduciaries must satisfy the substantive and
the procedural components of Section 404 of ERISA. 123 Procedu-
ral prudence requires a fiduciary to make an independent inquiry
into the merits of a particular investment decision. 124 Thus, a trus-
tee's lack of familiarity with an investment is no excuse for making
117. Infra Part D(1)(b).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1999) (enumerating prohibited transactions).
119. Id. § 1108 (enumerating exemptions from the list of prohibited transactions);
id. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
120. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (establishing the prudence requirement).
121. Id.
122. In re Unisys Sav. Plan Lit., 74 F.3d 420, 434 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Donovan
v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1467 (5th Cir. 1983))
123. Iezman, supra note 82, at 18 ("[ERISA] requires trustees to exercise procedu-
ral prudence in making investment decisions and to evaluate investment decisions
with substantive prudence.").
124. Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. N. Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d
313 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a plan fiduciary complied with ERISA's prudent
man standard when he utilized proper methods to investigate, evaluate and structure
the investment, acted in a manner as would others familiar with such matters, and
exercised independent judgment when making investment decisions); see also Hunter
v. Caliber Sys. Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 723 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that the test determin-
ing whether a fiduciary has satisfied his duty of prudence is whether individual trust-
ees, at the time they engaged in challenged transactions, employed appropriate
methods to investigate the merits of their investments and to structure their
investments).
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an imprudent investment. 125 The substantive component requires
that under an objective standard of prudence, trustees are judged
according to the standards of others acting in a like capacity and
familiar with such matters. 26 Accordingly, where trustees are un-
qualified to evaluate the soundness of a proposed investment, their
duty is to seek outside assistance. 127
Until recently, courts had focused their inquiry under the pru-
dent man rule on a review of the fiduciary's independent investiga-
tion of the merits of particular investments. 128  In measuring
trustees' conduct under the prudent man standard, a court typically
inquired whether they, at the time they engaged in the challenged
transaction, employed the appropriate methods for investigating
the merits of the investment and structuring the investment. 129
The inquiry under the prudence requirement of ERISA has un-
dergone substantial transformation in recent years. At least one
court has interpreted the prudence requirement of ERISA in light
of modern portfolio theory. 30 Laborers National Pension Fund v.
Northern Trust Quantitive Advisors, Inc.13 1 involved investments in
stripped interest-only mortgage-backed securities ("1Os"), which
give the right to the interest payments on a mortgage pool, and
stop producing income if mortgages are refinanced. In the early
1990s, many 1O investments lost money due to an unprecedented
level of mortgage refinancing, 132 including the investment by the
125. Lanka v. O'Higgins, 810 F. Supp. 379, 387 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that a fidu-
ciary's subjective, good-faith belief in investment does not insulate him from charges
that he acted imprudently).
126. United States v. Mason Tenders Dist. Council., 909 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (finding that ERISA's prudence standard is not that of a prudent lay person,
but rather that of a prudent fiduciary with experience dealing with similar enterprise).
127. Harley v. 3M, 42 F. Supp 2d. 898 (D.C. Minn. 1999) (noting that if a fiduciary
lacks the education, experience or skills to conduct a reasonable, independent investi-
gation of the risks and other characteristics of a proposed investment, the fiduciary
must seek independent advice).
128. Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that in evalu-
ating individual investments, fiduciaries are entitled to rely on expertise of others;
however, fiduciaries are responsible for ensuring that the information upon which the
expert's opinion is based is complete and up to date).
129. Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that union pen-
sion fund trustees violated their fiduciary obligations under ERISA by granting a loan
to a union's convalescent fund, of which they were also trustees, at below-market
interest rate).
130. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Modern Port-
folio Theory.
131. 173 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1999).
132. Id. at 316.
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fund.133 The suit alleged that the fiduciary, the defendant advisory
company, disregarded investment guidelines, which required that
investments be made that would "preserve principal while recog-
nizing the need for income and appreciation with a minimal
risk. ' 134 The guidelines also required that fund assets be diversi-
fied among different investment categories, including real estate,
money market instruments, and other appropriate investments.135
The district court held that the investments violated the "spirit" of
those guidelines because they involved risk to the principal, main-
taining that "it does not matter that other investment consultants
in the industry held the opinion that 1Os were appropriate for
modern investment portfolios or that the portfolio as a whole made
an adequate return. '' 136 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed, pointing out that stocks, real estate, and
other investments approved by the investment guidelines also in-
volved risk to principal.137 Interpreting the Department of Labor
regulations concerning investment prudence, it further held that a
fiduciary is "required to act as a prudent investment manager
under the modern portfolio theory rather than under the common
law of trusts standards which examined each investment with an
eye toward its individual riskiness. 1 38 The court concluded that
analyzing each investment in isolation would run counter to ER-
ISA's commitment to modern portfolio theory which focuses on
the portfolio as a whole. 139
ERISA contains no specific language on economically targeted
investments. The Department of Labor, which is charged with en-
forcing ERISA's fiduciary obligations, 14 ° set forth the regulatory
interpretation of ERISA's Prudent Man Rule in ERISA Regula-
tion No. 2550.404a-1.14 1 Under the standards established in that
regulation, taking into consideration collateral benefits of econom-
ically targeted investments is consistent with the Prudent Man Rule
133. Id.
134. Id. at 321.
135. Id.
136. Laborers Nat. Pension Fund v. ANB Inv. Mgmt. & Trust Co., No. 3:95-CV-
2504-T., 1997 WL 608956, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
137. 173 F.3d at 321.
138. Id. at 316.
139. Id.
140. 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (1999) (imposing an obligation on the Secretary of Labor to
police employee benefit plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1135 (1999) (empowering the Secretary of
Labor to prescribe regulations "as he finds necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of [ERISA]").
141. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (1999).
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as long as the fiduciary'has complied with its procedural and sub-
stantive fiduciary duties, and believes that the risk-adjusted return
on the investment is equal or greater than that otherwise available
from other similar investments. 42
b. Exclusive Benefit Rule
Economically targeted investments, like any other kind of pen-
sion fund investments, must satisfy the Exclusive Benefit Rule of
ERISA. 143 Sections 403 and 404 of ERISA require that fund in-
vestments be made for the exclusive benefit of plan participants. 144
The exclusive benefit requirement is different than the common
law duty of loyalty in that it imposes obligations on trustees over
and above those imposed by the prohibitions against self-deal-
ing.1 45 It prohibits a fiduciary from granting preferences between
participants or between beneficiaries in discharging his duties with
respect to the administration of a plan, 46 and requires that a trus-
tee exercise his discretion in serving the interests of all
participants. 47
ERISA does not prohibit decisions by plan sponsors that have
the obvious primary purpose and effect of benefiting employees
but also the incidental side effect of being prudent from the em-
ployers' economic perspective. 148 From the legislative history of
ERISA, it is clear that Congress did not intend the Act to penalize
employers for exercising their discretion to make rational eco-
nomic decisions in the best interests of both the employer and the
142. See Brock v. Walton, 794 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1986).
143. Iezman, supra note 82, at 24.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1999 & Supp. 2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1999);
see also White v. Distrib. Ass'n. Warehousemen's Pension Trust, 751 F.2d 1068, 1071
(9th Cir. 1985).
145. See, e.g., Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA's Fundamental Contra-
diction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1988) (arguing that
the exclusive benefit rule of ERISA, which has its origin in tax law, is broader than
the duty of loyalty of the common law).
146. Winpisinger v. Aurora Corp. of Ill., Precision Castings Div., 456 F. Supp. 559,
566 (N.D. Ohio 1978) (holding that 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001, 1104(a)(1), (a)(1)(A), re-
quiring a fiduciary to discharge his duties with respect to a plan "solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries" forbid the fiduciary, in discharge of his duties
with respect to plan, from granting preference as between plan's participants or as
between plan's beneficiaries).
147. Talarico v. United Furniture Workers Pension Fund, 479 F. Supp. 1072, 1081
(1979) (holding that under 29 U.S.C.A. § 1004(a)(1)(A), trustees of a union pension
fund had an obligation to protect fund and its participants and beneficiaries, and were
also obligated to exercise their discretion to serve interests of all participants in the
fund).
148. Holliday v. Xerox, Inc., 732 F.2d 548 (6th Cir. 1984).
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preservation of the benefit fund. 149 Thus, trustees of a plan do not
violate their fiduciary duties by taking action that, after careful and
impartial investigation, they reasonably conclude best promotes
the interests of participants and beneficiaries, simply because the
action incidentally benefits the employer or themselves. However,
their decisions must be made with an eye fixed exclusively on the
interests of the participants and beneficiaries.' 50
In 1994, the Department of Labor responded to the concerns of
the pension investment community by clarifying the issue of
whether the Exclusive Benefit Rule of ERISA prohibits invest-
ments that have the primary purpose and effect of benefiting plan
participants as well as the incidental effect of stimulating economic
development. In LB. 94-1,11' the Department of Labor interpreted
the Exclusive Benefit Rule of Sections 403 and 404 of ERISA as
permitting the practice of economically targeted investments.152
The Department of Labor declared that ERISA permits the con-
sideration of non-financial factors in selecting investments to the
extent that the risk-to-return ratio on such investments is at least as
favorable as other available investments. 53
However, several courts have disagreed with the Department of
Labor's position in I.B. 94-1 and several other advisory opinions
that ERISA's Exclusive Benefit Rule is not violated as long as fi-
duciaries do not subordinate the interests of participants to unre-
lated objectives. 54 In Leigh v. Engle,55 for example, the court
evaluated a portfolio's individual investments in isolation where
plan assets were used for corporate purposes, despite the fact that
the aggregate investment resulted in a seventy-two percent return.
In some contexts, however, courts have found collateral economic
benefits acceptable. For example, in First National Bank of Blue
149. Id. at 550.
150. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1982).
151. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (1999).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. The Department of Labor had previously stated this position in ERISA Op.
Letter No. 88-16A (Dec. 19, 1988), 1988 WL 222716, at *3 ("A decision to make an
investment may not be influenced by non-economic factors unless the investment,
when judged solely on the basis of its economic value to the plan, would be equal or
superior to alternative investments available to the plan.") and in Op. Letter No. 85-
36A (Oct. 23, 1985) 1985 WL 32830, at *2 ("A decision to make an investment may
not be influenced by a desire to stimulate the construction industry and generate em-
ployment, unless the investment, when judged solely on the basis of its economic
value to the plan, would be equal or superior to alternative investments available to
the plan."). It has also stated this position in several private opinion letters. Id.
155. 858 F.2d 361, 368 (7th Cir. 1988)
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Island ESOP v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem,156 the Seventh Circuit held that employee stock ownership
plans ("ESOPs"), which are invested primarily in the stock of the
sponsoring employer and are intended to provide a collateral bene-
fit for the sponsoring employer and for plan participants in the
form of worker ownership, are permissible under ERISA. How-
ever, courts have not yet addressed the applicability of the Exclu-
sive Benefit Rule of ERISA to economically targeted investments.
2. Regulations of State and Local Retirement Systems
State and municipal retirement systems 157 are excluded from
coverage under ERISA. 158 Typically, the investment of assets of
these retirement systems is governed by state statutes and the com-
mon law of trusts.'59 Case law also provides guidance on the issue
of fiduciary obligations of pension fund trustees. The primary fidu-
ciary duties relevant to economically targeted investments are the
common law duty of prudence, 160 the duty of loyalty, 161 and the
duty to follow the investment provisions of a statute or trust.162
Many states have incorporated the common law standards into
their statutory schemes governing public pension funds.163 Fur-
thermore, several states have enacted statutes enumerating the
transactions in which state retirement systems may engage.16 4 Al-
156. 802 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1986).
157. State and municipal retirement systems generally cover individuals employed
by the corresponding states and municipalities as well as their beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32 § 3 (West 1993 & Supp. 2000) (setting forth the re-
quirements for the membership in the Massachusetts Contributory Retirement Sys-
tem for Public Employees); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 40 (McKinney 1999 &
Supp. 2000) (providing for the membership of state employees in the New York Com-
mon Retirement Fund).
158. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(32), 1003(b) (1998).
159. E.g., N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 177 (McKinney 1999). For a general
review of the laws governing public retirement systems see CYNTHIA L. MOORE, PRO-
TECTING RETIREES' MONEY: FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND OTHER LAWS APPLICABLE TO
STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS (3rd ed. 1995).
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992).
161. Id. § 170 (establishing the duty of loyalty).
162. Id. § 228 (establishing the duty to follow trust documents).
163. ERISA's language on fiduciary obligations has been copied into several state
laws almost verbatim. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 22250 (West 1994); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 20151 (West Supp. 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.47(9) (West 1999) (incorpo-
rating ERISA standard by reference). Other state funds' governing statutes closely
approximate ERISA's standard. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 24-3-417; COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-54-112 (Michie 2000); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW §§ 177(9)(b), 422
(McKinney 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 25.15(2) (West 1998).
164. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 215.47 (West 1999); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 29
§ 38 (West 1992), N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 177 (McKinney 1999).
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though statutes regulating state and municipal retirement systems
have common characteristics, they are nonetheless different in
many important respects.165
While not directly applicable to public pension funds, ERISA
serves as an important legal guide to public fund fiduciaries. Sev-
eral states have modeled their public pension codes on ERISA.166
Additionally, the exclusive purpose requirement 67 and the prohib-
ited transactions rule168 of the Internal Revenue Code apply to
state retirement systems.
3. Uniform Management of Public Employee
Retirement Systems Act
Diverse as they are, the legal restrictions that many states and
localities impose on retirement systems are less stringent than
those contained in ERISA. 169 Furthermore, standards for vesting,
funding, and permissibility of investments also vary significantly
from one state to another.1 70 In prescribing fiduciary standards for
trustees of the retirement systems, several states use a standard
based on the common law of trusts,17' which considers individual
investments in isolation rather than in the context of the whole
portfolio. 72 Confounding the situation is the fact that state stat-
utes and municipal ordinances generally provide that public offi-
cials of their respective state or municipality be named trustees of
that state or municipality's retirement systems. 73 This situation is
a source of potential political conflicts, creating concerns over the
accountability of trustees for the investment decisions they make.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Law, citing the need for a uniform act to modernize, clarify, and
add to the rules governing the management of public retirement
165. MOORE, supra note 159 at vi-ix.
166. See generally id.
167. I.R.C. § 401(a)(2) (2000).
168. Id. § 503(b).
169. Steven L. Willborn, Public Pensions and the Uniform Management of Public
Employee Retirement Systems Act, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 141, 141-42 (1998).
170. Id.; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HEHS-96-56,
PUBLIC PENSIONS: STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO UN-
DERFUNDED PLANS 2 (1996).
171. MOORE, supra note 159 at vii.
172. See supra Part ID(1)(a).
173. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 20090 (West Supp. 2001) (members of the Board of
Administrators of the Public Employees' Retirement System include the State Con-
troller and the State Treasurer); N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 422 (McKinney
1999) (prescribing the duties of the State Comptroller as the sole trustee of the New
York Common Retirement Fund).
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systems, drafted the Uniform Management of Public Employee
Retirement Systems Act ("UMPERSA"). 174  The purpose of
UMPERSA was to facilitate the incorporation of modern invest-
ment practices into state law regulating the management of public
employee retirement systems. 75 It was further intended to ensure
greater accountability of fiduciaries and to strengthen the reporting
and disclosure requirements. 176 The Act emphasized that many
states rely on outdated legal principles which inhibit or prevent the
employment of modern investment practices. 77 According to its
drafters, the Act's adoption would prevent the loss of billions of
dollars in investment opportunities. 78
The drafters of UMPERSA recognized that although the pen-
sion participants and beneficiaries are the immediate beneficiaries
of a state retirement fund, the ultimate beneficiaries are the state's
taxpayers. 79 The drafters specifically addressed the legality of eco-
nomically targeted investments, noting that several states already
permit economically targeted investments, while others allow some
form of social investment practices, typically in dealing with coun-
tries like Cuba or South Africa.180 UMPERSA calls for the adop-
tion of a standard similar to the one set forth in LB. 94-1, allowing
pension fund trustees to consider collateral benefits resulting from
investments that have risk-return characteristics at least equal to
other alternative investments of the same class.18' To date, only a
few states have expressed interest in adopting the Act. 82
174. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMPLOYEE RET. Sys. ACT, Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A.
509-11 (1997).
175. Id. The drafters of the Act relied heavily on legal principles established in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992); UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, 7B
U.L.A. 280 (2000); and UNIF. PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT, 7B U.L.A. 131 (2000).
176. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT Sys. ACT, Prefatory Note, 7A
U.L.A. 510-11 (1997).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMPLOYEE RET. Sys. ACT § 8 cmt, 7A U.L.A. 532-33
(1997).
181. Id. § 8(a)(5) cmt.
182. Starting in January 1999, UMPERSA had been introduced in 16 states. These
include: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, North Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. South Carolina has passed the fiduciary sections of the Act.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, UNIFORM
MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, at http://
www.ncpers.org/05-legal.html#uniform-mgmt (last accessed on March 29, 2001).
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II. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF AND IN OPPOSITION TO
ECONOMICALLY TARGETED INVESTMENTS
The legality of economically targeted investments has been hotly
debated since they were first proposed in the early 1990s. 183 Put-
ting aside partisan rhetoric, the argument revolves around two in-
terconnected issues: (1) whether ETIs are economically feasible
for pension funds and (2) whether they cause pension fund trustees
to violate their fiduciary obligations toward plan participants and
their beneficiaries.' 84
This Part contrasts two conflicting views on the legality of eco-
nomically targeted investments. First, it distinguishes ETIs from
social investments. Second, it presents the theory of capital gaps
underlying the concept of economically targeted investments and
reviews the legal arguments in support of ETIs. Third, it presents
the view against the legality of ETIs. Finally, it demonstrates how
criticism of the policy of economically targeted investing has
caused a significant decline in pension fund trustees' interest in this
investing strategy.
A. ETIs Distinguished from Socially Responsible Investing185
Economically targeted investments are frequently confused with
socially responsible investing.' 86 However, the two are distinct in
several respects. Socially responsible investments generally are
characterized as those made with a social cause in mind and typi-
cally result in reduced returns and less than optimum diversifica-
183. Cindy Skrzycki, To GOP, 'Targeted Investments' Are Just Retiree Robbery,
WASH. POST, June 2, 1995, at F01 ("Pension experts say there are at least as many
opinions on the quality and risks of ETIs as there are supporters and critics of
them."); see also Lurie, supra note 27; Protecting Retirees, supra note 21; Phone the
Department of Labor, supra note 21.
184. Compare Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21, at 336 ("The ETI
concept is unsound as a matter of policy and logic and is incomparable with ERISA's
statutory standards governing pension trustees' investment decisions.") with Protect-
ing Retirees, supra note 21, at 47 ("Critics of economically targeted investments argue
that these investments are illegal under ERISA. But clearly this is not the case.").
185. Lewis D. Solomon & Karen C. Coe, Social Investments by Nonprofit
Corporations and Charitable Trusts: A Legal and Business Primer for Foundation
Managers and Other Nonprofit Fiduciaries, 66 UMKC L. REV. 213, 214 (1997)
("[S]ocial investing is the systematic incorporation of ethical values and objectives in
the investment decision-making process. Over the last 80 years, these values and
objectives-sometimes referred to as 'social screens'-have evolved from simple
exclusionary policies to highly nuanced evaluations of corporate behavior.") (quoting
Peter D. Kinder, Social Investing's Strength Lies in Readiness to Deal With the World's
Tough Questions, PENSION WORLD, Apr. 1993, at 11).
186. Testimony of Robert Reich, supra note 10.
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tion.187 Pension fund trustees have been criticized for engaging in
such investments under political pressure. 18 8 By contrast, at least
in theory, economically targeted investments do not sacrifice the
interests of plan participants for larger social goals, and are aimed
at achieving "a public or social benefit as well as [a] financial gain
for participants." 189
Policies underlying social investments have traditionally been
based on one of the two theories. 90 The first advocates accepting
lower returns while investing in socially desirable projects, allowing
that potential investment returns for an individual might suffer in
order to benefit the rest of society.' 91 Critics have rightly noted
that substituting the interests of society in general for those of plan
participants violates fiduciary duties, and may result in administra-
tive and judicial remedies for plan participants, civil and criminal
penalties for the fund trustees, as well as potential plan
disqualification.' 92
The second theory is that of disinvestment. 93 This policy, which
calls for avoiding certain types of investments, has been commonly
used by a number of institutional investors in the U.S. over a pe-
riod of years. 94 For example, several states and municipalities
have at one point enacted statutes prohibiting state retirement sys-
tems from investing in companies doing business with South Af-
187. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of
Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72 (1980).
188. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Gov-
ernance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 798 (1993) ("There is an inverse rela-
tion between the return on funds' investments and the degree of political involvement
in their organizational form, and between return on investments and policies favoring
social investing.").
189. Brian R. Talcott, Comment, Economically Targeted Investments: Using Public
Pension Fund Dollars to Close Capital Gaps in Oregon, 74 OR. L. REV. 1031, 1049
(1995) (quoting Pat Griffith, AFL-CIO Pension Money May Fund City Housing,
PrrTSURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 16, 1994, at A6).
190. Patrick S. Cross, Note, Economically Targeted Investments-Can Public Pen-
sion Plans Do Good and Do Well?, 68 IND. L.J. 931, 934-41 (1993) (describing socially
responsible investing strategies).
191. Id. at 937.
192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1952); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 227 (1992); Talcott, supra note 186, at 1051.
193. E.g., Thomas A. Troyer et al., Divestment of South Africa Investments: The
Legal Implications for Foundations, Other Charitable Institutions, and Pension Funds,
74 GEO. L.J. 127, 154-61 (1985); Donlan, supra note 46 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the rationale behind the policy of divestment by pension funds).
194. See, e.g., Mark B. Baker, Flying Over The Judicial Hump: A Human Rights
Drama Featuring Burma, The Commonwealth Of Massachusetts, The WTO, and The
Federal Courts, 32 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 51 (2000); Lurie, supra note 27, at 349-50;
Solomon, supra note 185, at 214.
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rica, Burma, and others engaging in widespread human rights
abuses. 95 Other screening mechanisms have required the exclu-
sion of investments in tobacco companies or companies employing
ecologically unfriendly technologies.' 96
Although concerns over heightened risk involving investments in
certain countries or industries may sometimes justify disinvest-
ment,1 97 this policy is not without its critics.1 9 s When the policy of
disinvestment effectively denies a pension plan reasonable invest-
ment alternatives or adequate diversification, ERISA may prohibit
this practice. 99 Critics maintain that excluding investment pos-
sibilities solely on social grounds without considering their eco-
nomic and financial merit is inconsistent with trustees' fiduciary
obligations.200
Moreover, critics have noted that socially responsible invest-
201ments are frequently made under political pressure. These in-
vestments then turn into politically targeted investments when
trustees who have been pressured by special interest groups to ac-
cept below-market returns attempt to justify their investment
choices by pointing to the perceived benefit to society in lieu of
benefits to plan participants and their beneficiaries.20 2
B. Arguments in Support of Economically
Targeted Investments
Proponents of economically targeted investments have advanced
several arguments in favor of ETIs' legality, distinguishing them
from socially responsible investments. These arguments are predi-
cated on the unique nature of pension funds, which allows trustees
195. See, e.g., THE SOROS ORG., LOCALITIES WITH BURMA LEGISLATION, at http://
www.soros.org/intlinit.html (last visited March 25, 2001).
196. Cross, supra note 190, at 934-35.
197. Lurie, supra note 27, at 349-50; Solomon & Coe, supra note 185, at 224 ("The
immediate loss resulting from divesting a security could be justified, even under the
prudent investor rule, if the trustee concludes that the potential economic loss would
be far more damaging to the income and safety of the trust corpus.") (quoting Kan.
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 85-153 (1985) available in WL 204845)).
198. Lurie, supra note 27, at 350.
199. Id.
200. Id. ("[A]ny plan which for so-called social purposes excludes investment pos-
sibilities without consideration of their economic and financial merit is showing insuf-
ficient care for and disloyalty to individuals covered by the plans. Fiduciaries
following such a course would . . . be acting at their peril.").
201. Romano, supra note 188, at 802.
202. Id.
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to profitably invest in inefficient markets20 3 without jeopardizing
the safety of the retirement benefits of plan participants. ETI sup-
porters contend that the Department of Labor has had a long-
standing policy of supporting these types of investments20 4 and that
the legality of ETIs has been recognized in the Uniform Manage-
ment of Public Employee Retirement Systems Act. 0 5
1. Capital Gaps
The theoretical underpinning of the concept of ETIs is the the-
ory of "capital gaps," which postulates that various socioeconomic
conditions create market inefficiencies 206 in several sectors of the
economy, including affordable housing in inner-cities and minority
207businesses, causing traditional lenders to withhold funds from
these markets. According to proponents of economically targeted
investments, pension funds are well positioned to engage in devel-
opmental investing because they can effectively identify and close
such capital gaps.20 8 Pension funds, unlike many other institutional
investors, generally do not require high liquidity from their invest-
ments due to highly predictable payment obligations. Thus, they
can identify somewhat less liquid investment opportunities that
combine economic development with unimpeded provision of re-
tirement benefits in traditionally underfinanced sectors of the
economy.20 9 Close scrutiny of potential investment opportunities
203. Economic evidence shows that, from a typical investment perspective, the ma-
jor capital markets are highly efficient in the sense that available information is rap-
idly digested and reflected in the market prices of securities. See, e.g., Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 770 (1985). However, modern research also sug-
gests that some inefficiencies remain, even in the most efficient of markets. See, e.g.,
Stanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally
Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1980).
204. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 47 ("[T]he Department has never stated
that all incidental or collateral benefits are prohibited.").
205. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMPLOYEE RET. Sys. ACT § 8(a)(5) cmt., 7A U.L.A.
532-33 (1997).
206. Maria O'Brien Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus
Doing Well in an Inefficient Market, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 24 n.97 (1992) (discussing
the literature on inefficiencies of capital markets).
207. For a discussion of regulatory and market obstacles facing developers in inner-
city communities, see Keith N. Hylton, Banks And Inner Cities: Market And Regula-
tory Obstacles To Development Lending, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 197 (2000). See also
Daniel M. Leibsohn, Financial Services Innovation in Community Development, 8 J.
OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 122, 124-26 (1999) (discussing
capital needs in low-income communities).
208. LAWRENCE LITVAK, PENSION FUNDS & ECONOMIC RENEWAL 9 (1981).
209. Id. at 120.
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in these sectors of the economy may reveal potential collateral
benefits in the form of economic development, job creation, and
the like.210 According to the proponents of ETIs, in order to sat-
isfy their fiduciary obligations to plan participants, pension funds
should invest in such projects only after carefully considering all of
the economic characteristics of such potential investments and con-
cluding they are capable of producing market rates of return.
The concept of capital gaps is predicated on the existence of
market inefficiencies and information asymmetries. 211 For various
reasons, such inefficiencies abound in the United States.212 The
proponents of ETIs have testified before Congress on several occa-
sions regarding specific instances of capital gaps in various sectors
of the economy including affordable housing and venture capi-
tal. 13 According to Professor Zanglein, traditional investors fre
quently "[a]void capital investments in certain sectors for various
reasons, ranging from human nature reflected in express discrimi-
nation or lack of empathy, to dynamic shifts in savings patterns
over the course of years and a transfer of capital assets from local
banks to pension funds managed by national investment manag-
ers." 214 By definition, economically targeted investments are niche
projects that take advantage of local conditions, 15 being too small
to attract large institutional investors, but well-suited for local pen-
sion funds.
Several factors account for the existence of a capital gap in af-
fordable housing. First, putting together an affordable housing
deal is relatively difficult and requires specialized expertise that
many institutional investors lack. Secondly, because affordable
housing projects are generally local in nature, many such projects
remain unfunded because large institutional investors like national
insurance companies and investment banks do not know of their
existence. Even before issuing I.B. 94-1, the Department of Labor
had established a clearinghouse for economically targeted invest-
ment opportunities, which was intended to screen investment op-
portunities suitable for pension funds.21 6 Under pressure from
210. Id. at 121-24.
211. See Hylton, supra note 207, at 208-18 (discussing the asymmetric information
theory, and arguing that it accounts for discriminatory lending practices facing inner-
city developers).
212. LITVAK, supra note 208 at 9-16.
213. Testimony of Olena Berg, supra note 2.
214. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 52.
215. Id. at 53.
216. Testimony of Olena Berg, supra note 2.
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congressional republicans and conservative organizations,217 the fi-
nancing for the government-run clearinghouse was discontinued,
and the project was replaced with one run by a private
organization.2 18
2. Economically Targeted Investments Do Not Violate Fiduciary
Obligations of Pension Fund Trustees
According to a 1993 study by the Institute for Fiduciary Educa-
tion, pension fund trustees refrain from making ETIs due to a per-
ceived conflict with their fiduciary duties to plan participants. 219 It
is this misconception that the pro-ETI commentators vigorously
sought to refute.220
Proponents of economically targeted investments argue these in-
vestments are consistent with the fiduciary obligations of pension
fund fiduciaries. 22 ' They reaffirm the general principle that all pen-
sion fund investments must be prudent.2 22 According to the propo-
nents of ETIs, The Department of Labor, which is charged with
enforcing the compliance of private pension funds with the fiduci-
ary requirements found in ERISA, has been consistently support-
ing the legality of ETIs.223
3. The Department of Labor's Position on Economically
Targeted Investments
The critics of economically targeted investments maintain that
by allowing pension fund fiduciaries to consider investments pro-
ducing collateral benefits, the Department of Labor unnecessarily
217. See, e.g., Mark Wilson, How to Close Down the Department of Labor, THE
BACKGROUNDER, OCT. 19, 1995, at 1.
218. Hamilton Securities Gets DOL Contract to Establish First Clearinghouse on
ETIs, 21 PENS. & BENEFITS REP. 1925 (1994).
219. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 53 ("Thirty-seven percent of the funds
stated that the principal reason they did not invest in ETIs is because of perceived
conflicts with fiduciary duties.") (quoting INSTITUTE FOR FIDUCIARY EDUCATION,
supra note 99, at B-2 tbl. B-8)).
220. See, e.g., id.; Lurie, supra note 27, at 351; Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, High Per-
formance Investing: Harnessing the Power of Pension Funds to Promote Economic
Growth and Workplace Integrity, 11 LAB. LAW 59 (1995).
221. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 50 ("[A] fiduciary can choose an invest-
ment that offers a collateral benefit if the fiduciary has acted prudently and has re-
ceived a competitive rate of return.").
222. Id.; see also Lurie, supra note 27, at 330.
223. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 48-50, 51-52. Professor Zanglein main-
tains that "[tjhe basic statement of philosophy [on incidental benefits] has remained
virtually unchanged over the last twenty years." Id. at 48.
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diluted the exclusive benefit requirement of ERISA in I.B. 94-1.24
Proponents of ETIs refute this contention, maintaining that in I.B.
94-1, the Department of Labor explained and reinforced the policy
it had been consistently following since the Carter Administra-
tion.2 2 5 Specifically, LB. 94-1 refers to several Department of La-
bor advisory opinions and letters, which consistently maintained
that pension fund fiduciaries can be influenced by factors unrelated
to the plan's expected investment returns.226 According to Olena
Berg, the former Assistant Labor Secretary for Pensions and Wel-
fare Benefits, the new clarification expressed in I.B. 94-1 was no
change from the status quo, and broke no new ground.227
C. Arguments in Opposition to ETIs
1. Economically Targeted Investments Are
Economically Unsound
Critics of economically targeted investments believe that ETIs
are economically unsound. 28 They argue that, contrary to the uni-
versally accepted notion of the efficiency of capital markets, the
concept of economically targeted investments is based on the
flawed argument that certain competitive investments will remain
unfunded due to a number of factors beyond the market character-
istics of such investments.2 9 Criticizing the notion of exploiting
inefficient markets, opponents of ETIs point out that in a free-mar-
ket society scarce resources must be used efficiently. 3 ° If econom-
ically targeted investments carry market rates of return, then,
through the regular operation of the market, investors will fund
such projects.23' If markets where certain investment opportunities
exist are inefficient, then such opportunities are overpriced or oth-
224. See Critical Analysis, supra note 23, at 41 ("[B]y what authority can DOL ad-
ministrators dilute the statutory directive that pension trustees foster only the retire-
ment benefits of participants and their beneficiaries?").
225. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 48.
226. Supra note 154 and accompanying text; Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at
48.
227. Testimony of Olena Berg, supra note 2.
228. E.g., Thomas A. Smith, Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate
Finance, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1, 32 (1997) ("ETIs appear to introduce a bias into portfolio
selection that has a systematic effect on portfolio performance."); Phone the Depart-
ment of Labor, supra note 21, at 336 ("The ETI concept is unsound as a matter of
policy and logic .... ").
229. See generally John R. Nofsinger, Why Targeted Investing Does Not Make
Sense!, FIN. MGMT., Sept. 22, 1998, at 87.
230. See Critical Analysis, supra note 23, at 40-41; Phone the Department of Labor,
supra note 21, at 338.
231. Nofsinger, supra note 229.
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erwise not attractive, and investment in such projects will be detri-
mental to plan participants.232
These critics also point out that while the definition of economi-
cally targeted investments refers to market rates of returns, the
proper evaluation of such potential returns is possible only in effi-
cient markets.233 They argue that to ensure that ETIs provide com-
petitive returns, markets must be well-functioning, with sufficiently
delineated characteristics, to permit accurate performance valua-
tion.234 Conversely, in poorly-functioning markets, there is a dis-
tinct possibility, due to reduced discipline of investors and
insufficient disclosure, that market rates will be below prevailing
levels. 235
Critics also contend that the policy of economically targeted in-
vestment may lead to pension capital being redirected from legiti-
mate and well-performing investments toward politically motivated
investments in underperforming projects. 236 This risk is particu-
larly high with public employee retirement systems, which typically
maintain close ties with the state governments.237 They argue that
should the investments underperform, to justify lower returns, pen-
sion fund trustees would refer to collateral benefits arguably real-
ized from such projects. 238  According to the critics, the
Department of Labor implicitly signaled to pension fund trustees
they can factor in collateral returns in their investment selection
practices as long as such investments are branded as ETIs.239
Finally, critics maintain that as a matter of policy it is more desir-
able to correct market inefficiencies, rather than to inspire pension
fund managers to invest in inefficient markets.240 When market
failures are corrected, investors other than pension funds would be
attracted to such markets.24'
232. Critical Analysis, supra note 23, at 40.
233. Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21, at 339.
234. Id.
235. Id.; Critical Analysis, supra note 23, at 40.
236. Smith, supra note 228, at 31 ("Despite the name, ETIs are investments made
on political, not economic, grounds."); Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21,
at 349.
237. Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21, at 349.
238. Id. at 352.
239. Id. at 345. According to Professor Zelinsky, the Department of Labor "whole-
hearted[ly] embrace[d] . . . incidental economic benefits as legitimate criteria upon
which pension trustees can base their investment choices." Id. at 343.
240. Id. at 339.
241. Id.
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2. Economically Targeted Investments Violate Fiduciary
Obligations of Pension Fund Trustees
At the heart of the argument against ETIs lies the view that
these investments violate the fiduciary obligations of pension fund
trustees. Critics maintain that economically targeted investments
violate ERISA section 404(a)(1)(A)(i) which requires pension fi-
duciaries to act solely in the interests of the plan's participants and
beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose. of providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries. 242 They point out that histori-
cally the definition of a benefit has been a narrow one, with retire-
ment disability and death payments being the only plan
distributions qualifying as benefits to plan participants. 243 Thus,
the definition of benefits does not extend to collateral benefits to
plan participants.244
According to these critics, the Department of Labor defined
benefits too broadly in I.B. 94-1, implicitly including socially desir-
able incidental benefits as a valid consideration in selecting invest-
ments.245 They argue the Department of Labor was not justified in
extending the definition of benefits under ERISA.246 Making inci-
dental benefits to society a legitimate criterion in selecting invest-
ments is inconsistent with ERISA and other sources of law
governing pension fund investments.247
Furthermore, critics of ETIs argue that these investments run a
high risk of being imprudent from the standpoint of ERISA.2 48
Because ETIs are made in inefficient markets, revealing rates for
similar investments cannot be ascertained, especially considering
that other investors have overlooked these investments.249 There-
fore, critics argue, investing in such projects is unwise, imprudent,
and contrary to the requirements of ERISA.2 5 °
242. Id. at 342.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 344-45.
246. Id. at 342.
247. Id. at 344-47.
248. Critical Analysis, supra note 23, at 48 n.30; Phone the Department of Labor,
supra note 21, at 338; see also S.Q. Della Grotta, Taking a Look at Pension Funds and
the ETIs, PENSION WORLD, Sept. 1993, at 42 (maintaining that consideration of fac-
tors secondary to maximum financial gain is inconsistent with the duty of prudence).
249. Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21, at 336-39.
250. Id. at 336, 342-47.
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III. BEYOND ETIs: MAKING TARGETED INVESTMENTS IN
Low-To-MODERATE INCOME RESIDENTIAL
REAL ESTATE WORK
In examining the debate surrounding the legality of economi-
cally targeted investments, it appears that the divide between the
proponents and the opponents of ETIs is deep and irreconcilable.
While one side argues that taking into consideration interests other
than those of plan participants in selecting investments is consistent
with the fiduciary obligations of pension fund trustees,25 ' the other
side categorically rejects this contention, maintaining that even
mentioning factors other than the benefit of plan participants vio-
lates various fiduciary laws.2 5 2 Despite the Department of Labor's
clarification of its position on economically targeted investments in
LB. 94_12"3 and the attempt of the drafters of UMPERSA 254 to per-
suade states to adopt the standard, the uncertainty concerning this
fundamental principle of fiduciary obligations is too deeply rooted,
and the punishment too severe, for conservatively-minded trustees
to universally embrace ETIs. As a result, although pension funds
are well-positioned to become major players in the low-to-moder-
ate income residential real estate market, their participation in this
sector of the economy has been negligible in proportion to the
amount of assets they hold. No less than a radical change in the
legislative and regulatory climate is required to bring targeted in-
vestments in low-to-moderate income residential real estate into
the investing mainstream.
However, this goal will likely be impossible to accomplish within
the constraints of the outdated ETI framework. Although the po-
sition of the critics on the legality of economically targeted invest-
ments appears to be too extreme,55 the arguments in support of
ETIs also suffer from several deficiencies. First, although the Inter-
pretive Bulletin 94-1 declared that ERISA does not prohibit trust-
ees from considering collateral benefits,256 it failed to adequately
delineate situations in which such benefits would be permissible.
251. Lurie, supra note 27; Protecting Retirees, supra note 21.
252. Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21, at 343.
253. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Fiduciary Standard Under ERISA in
Considering Economically Targeted Investments, 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-1 (1994).
254. UNIF. MGMT. OF PUB. EMPLOYEE RET. Sys. Acr, 7A U.L.A. 510 (1997).
255. For instance, Alvin Lurie, the Chairman of the New York State Bar Associa-
tion's Special Committee on Pension Simplification, maintains that the notion of "ex-
clusivity," as argued by the critics of ETIs, is misleading and does not reflect the
intention of the drafters of ERISA. Lurie, supra note 27, at 330-33.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
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In other words, it failed to define the attributes of an acceptable
ETI. Secondly, it failed to account for the fact that the fiduciaries'
obligations are not extinguished upon making an investment deci-
sion, but rather continue to include the duty to monitor the plan's
assets and dispose of underperforming positions. 7 Political pres-
sure on pension fund trustees in keeping underperforming invest-
ments, coupled with the lack of accountability, can as easily be the
source of violations of the exclusive benefit rule and the common
law duty of loyalty as if the pressure was exerted on trustees to
initially invest in ETIs. Finally, the legal framework of a traditional
ETI model does not adequately deal with the issue of incentives for
trustees to engage in ETIs.258 These shortcomings of the tradi-
tional ETI model contributed to the unceasing debate over the le-
gality of these investments, causing conservative-minded trustees
to avoid such transactions.
However, at least with respect to real estate investments, the two
positions may not be as divergent as they appear. The onerous fi-
duciary obligations pension fund trustees face in selecting real es-
tate investments can be reconciled with the policy of targeting low-
to-moderate income residential real estate. This, however, may re-
quire the revision of the concept of economically targeted invest-
ments, and the way pension funds target this market sector. This
Part acknowledges various shortcomings of the traditional ETI
model that adversely affect the willingness of pension fund trustees
to invest in low-to-moderate income residential real estate. It then
proposes an alternative approach to conceptualizing pension fund
investments in low-to-moderate income residential real estate. It
also suggests several policy approaches aimed at making invest-
ments in low-to-moderate income residential real estate more at-
tractive to pension funds while guaranteeing the security of
pension assets.
A. Shortcomings of the ETI Model as Applicable to Pension
Plan Investments in Affordable Housing
Although pension funds have significant potential as a source of
capital for economic development, the extent to which they allo-
cate funds to low-to-moderate income residential real estate is neg-
ligible in proportion to their portfolios.2 59 For a number of
257. Iezman, supra note 82, at 21.
258. Patterson, supra note 20.
259. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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reasons, the interest in targeted investments in affordable residen-
tial real estate has been steadily declining in recent years.2 60
Several factors combine to create conditions adverse to the
proliferation of economically targeted investments. First, pension
funds are very sensitive to changes in the regulatory climate; the
debate over the legality of ETIs has not clarified the issue to the
satisfaction of conservatively-minded trustees. Furthermore, no
uniform standard exists throughout states, and the existing ETI
programs have not been tested in courts. Second, several charac-
teristics of economically targeted investments distinguishing them
from other investment types have not allowed ETIs, as a separate
investment class, to become an integral part of pension fund port-
folios. Finally, the policies of the federal and state governments
have not provided pension funds with sufficient incentives to en-
gage in targeted investments in affordable housing.
B. The Issue of the Legality of Targeted Pension Fund
Investments Has Not Been Adequately Resolved
The debate over the legality of economically targeted invest-
ments has not resolved the issue to the satisfaction of pension fund
trustees. Because transactions that are found to be imprudent or in
violation of the exclusive benefit requirement are subject to rescis-
sion,261 and can expose plan fiduciaries to personal liability,262 the
trustees will continue to factor in the uncertainty over the legality
of sufch investments in their investment decision-making process.
Although the proponents of ETIs argue that these investments
are legal under ERISA and the common law of trusts, 63 this con-
tention is far from clear. For instance, critics of ETIs points out
that benefits to plan participants have historically been narrowly
260. It is worth noting in this context, however, that pension funds increased alloca-
tions to domestic and foreign equity as this sector of the capital market experienced
unprecedented growth during late 1990's. As a typical pension plan portfolio has
risen in price due to stock appreciation, the percentage of the plan's allocations to real
estate relative to the whole portfolio generally decreased. FLOW OF FUNDS, supra
note 5 at 49, 76.
261. Diane M. Sumoski, Litigation Under ERISA: Participant And Beneficiary
Remedies Under ERISA: Extracontractual and Punitive Damages After Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1014-18 (1986) (dis-
cussing the availability of various civil remedies to plan participants and beneficiaries
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1999), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1999), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(1)(B) (1999), and 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)(3) (1999)).
262. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) (1999).
263. Lurie, supra note 27; Protecting Retirees, supra note 21.
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defined,264 meaning that pension fund trustees would be prohibited
under ERISA from selecting investments providing primary bene-
fits to plan participants and their beneficiaries in a form other than
retirement or death payments. However, no case law currently ex-
ists on the issue of whether plan trustees may consider benefits
other than purely financial gains accruing to plan participants or to
society in general.
Equally uncertain is the legality of ETIs under the prudent man
rule of ERISA and state statutes. Although courts have indicated
that pension fund investments do not violate the prudence require-
ment of ERISA if at the time when such investments were made,
they were adequately researched, and the portfolio as a whole pro-
vided an adequate return,265 whether the same reasoning can be
extended to targeted investments in inefficient markets is unclear.
The unavoidable corollary of investing in inefficient markets is the
reduction in opportunity to conduct thorough economic research
of such investments. Traditionally defined ETIs in affordable
housing are unique projects, 266 with all the risks associated with
inefficient markets. Accordingly, due to the limited information
available to pension fund trustees, many potentially good invest-
ments are rejected at initial stages of investment decision making
due to their non-compliance with strict guidelines that pension
funds typically establish to ensure compliance with the prudence
requirement of ERISA or state laws.
Many potential economically targeted investments in low-to-
moderate income residential real estate do not satisfy the currently
existing portfolio selection criteria of a number of pension funds.
Pension funds, particularly state retirement systems, are notorious
for their conservative investment selection practices.2 6a Because
most traditional economically targeted investments are niche
projects involving custom contracts and specialized approaches, 68
many pension plans do not have the requisite experience and skills
to undertake them. Pension funds typically employ qualified real
estate investment professionals or outside advisors to shift personal
liability stemming from making real estate investment decisions;
269
264. Phone the Department of Labor, supra note 21, at 342 (citing James D. Hutch-
inson & Charles G. Cole, Legal Standards Governing Investment of Pension Assets for
Social and Political Goals, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1340, 1370 (1980)).
265. See Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 50, 54-55.
266. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 53.
267. E.g., Cunningham, supra note 45, at 733.
268. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 53-54.
269. See generally Iezman, supra note 82, at 20-21.
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for certain projects the administrative costs can be prohibitive. 7 °
Furthermore, public pension funds operate under tighter budgets
than private funds and typically employ fewer investment profes-
sionals. The combination of two characteristics-large sums of
capital to invest plus fewer qualified investment professionals-has
the effect of raising the minimum investment size, in many cases to
between $10 and $25 million.271 Such high limits disqualify most
projects targeted to create local benefits.
In addition to self-imposed investment guidelines, statutory re-
strictions may further prevent pension funds from investing in inef-
ficient markets. Various statutory schemes based on a more
conservative interpretation of fiduciary duties of the trustees of
state retirement systems may preempt the discretion vested in the
trustees in questions of investment selection.272
However, ERISA, as well as many state statutes regulating re-
tirement systems, contains no explicit language concerning eco-
nomically targeted investments.273 Uncertain about the course of
action that Congress might take with respect to future and past
economically targeted investments, pension trustees are unwilling
to commit funds to decades-long, low-liquidity projects like low-to-
moderate income residential real estate, even if such projects
promise job creation and increased housing availability in their re-
spective states.274
C. The Uncertainty Over the Legality of Targeted Investments
Serves As an Additional Risk Factor That Trustees
Consider in Making Investment Decisions.
The strategy of increasing the popularity of pension fund invest-
ments in affordable residential real estate depends on the percep-
tion concerning their legality. Because targeted affordable
residential real estate investments by pension funds (even if not
branded as ETIs) generally produce collateral economic bene-
270. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 53 ("The main problem economically
targeted investors face is ... the excessive information and transactions costs associ-
ated with an immature market.") (quoting Teresa Ghilarducci, U.S. Pension Invest-
ment Policy and Perfect Capital Market Theory, CHALLENGE, July 1994, at 4); see also
Testimony of Lee Smith, supra note 28.
271. See, e.g., GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE SYSTEM, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET, 46 (1995)
(discussing pension funds investments in private equities).
272. See supra Part II(C)(2).
273. Supra Part I(D)(1).
274. See Patterson, supra note 20, at 18.
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fits, 275 it can create the appearance of impropriety on the part of
the trustees. In the legislative and regulatory vacuum produced by
the lack of a clear standard for assessing the legality of targeted
investing, pension fund trustees, wary of the arbitrariness of poten-
tial suits for violating fiduciary obligations, will continue to main-
tain their skepticism of targeted investments.
The primary weakness of the concept of economically targeted
investments is the focus on individual capital gaps in local markets
that pension funds can identify and close.276 Pursuant to this strat-
egy, pension fund trustees are required to formulate criteria for
determining the existence of capital gaps. Fund trustees need to
review potential targeted investments individually, applying their
subjective judgment to determine that the project has not been fi-
nanced due to capital gaps. It is the arbitrariness of these criteria
and the lack of trustee accountability that makes pension funds
susceptible to political pressure.
It is unquestionable, however, that from a purely economic per-
spective, investments in low-to-moderate income residential real
estate can be valuable additions to pension fund portfolios. As dis-
cussed earlier, aside from favorable risk-return characteristics, such
investments can be valuable as a hedge against inflation, as well as
for diversification purposes.277 The economic benefits of investing
in low-to-moderate income residential real estate in many cases
outweigh the increased costs of investment advice and project valu-
ation associated with the novelty and the uniqueness of such
investments.278
If investment opportunities in low-to-moderate income residen-
tial real estate offer clear and readily quantifiable economic bene-
fits to the plan participants, and if pension fund fiduciaries
otherwise comply with their legal obligations in making such in-
vestments, nothing in the law prevents trustees from investing in
such projects. Thus, the contention of critics that the exclusive
benefit rule of ERISA is violated when trustees take into consider-
ation benefits in the form of economic stimulus incidental to
targeted investments in low-to-moderate income housing, when
such investments otherwise satisfy the prudent man rule of ERISA
and state laws,279 is without merit. Since neither ERISA, nor state
275. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 207-214 and accompanying text.
277. MADISON, supra note 64, at 662.
278. Protecting Retirees, supra note 21, at 53-54.
279. Critical Analysis, supra note 23.
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laws impose per se restrictions prohibiting pension funds from in-
vesting in any particular sector of the economy or in projects lo-
cated in a targeted geographic area (when such investments are not
on the list of prohibited transactions), it must follow that when
such incidental benefits come only secondary to the economic con-
siderations, the exclusive benefit rule is not violated.
In many instances potential targeted investments could be
clearly imprudent given the aims and philosophy of a particular
plan. Investments in low-to-moderate income residential real es-
tate can require extraordinarily high levels of scrutiny due to the
unique and complicated nature of residential real estate transac-
tions in inefficient markets, especially when such opportunities are
presented to relatively inexperienced and unsophisticated plans.28°
Although potential returns could be significant, 81 the risk associ-
ated with such investments would be unjustifiable under that plan's
guidelines. Certain pension plans are required to flatly reject such
inferior investment opportunities.
Most investment opportunities in affordable housing, however,
fall in the gray area where their legality under ERISA and state
laws cannot be easily ascertained. As a result, pension funds con-
sider the legal uncertainty of such projects as an additional risk
factor. Because the data concerning these investments could be
scarce, investment yield and risk estimates could vary broadly.282
When the economic feasibility of such projects is not obvious, it is
unavoidable that under such ambiguous circumstances the trustees
would factor the uncertainty over the legality of such projects in
their investment decision-making process. In some cases, this addi-
tional risk factor would result in disqualifying otherwise economi-
cally sound investment opportunities.
The uncertainty over the consistency of targeted investments
with the fiduciary obligations of pension fund fiduciaries could,
therefore, discourage trustees from making investments that are
capable of producing market rates of return. Although trustees are
required to exercise sound discretion within legal constraints in se-
lecting fund investments,283 the matter of the legality of targeted
investments is far from settled.284 Consequently, though pension
fund trustees must discharge their duties for the exclusive benefit
280. See generally Iezrnan, supra note 82, at 20-21.
281. See supra part B.
282. Critical Analysis, supra note 23, at 40.
283. Talcott, supra note 189, at 1036
284. See generally supra part II.
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of plan participants, the fact that investments of great social impor-
tance are being rejected based on an untested interpretation of the
law is difficult to justify. Furthermore, the policy of arbitrary re-
strictions on otherwise economically sound opportunities may be
imprudent and therefore violative of ERISA.285
1. Reconciling the Trustees' Fiduciary Duties With the Realities
of a Targeted Affordable Residential Real Estate Market
a. An Enabling Legislation Alone May Not Be Sufficient
One way of putting to rest many concerns of private pension
fund trustees over the legitimacy of ETIs would be the adoption of
an amendment to ERISA expressly permitting a broad range of
economically targeted investments classes.286 Similarly, adopting
UMPERSA, which contains language identical to that of I.B. 94-
1, 287 would accomplish this goal on the state level. So far, however,
neither Congress nor state legislatures have signaled their intention
to move in this direction.288
However, the legislation alone will not prompt a sizable increase
in pension investments in in-state low-to-moderate income residen-
tial real estate. The fiduciary obligations do not extinguish imme-
diately after the investment has been made.289  Assuming that
ERISA and state laws expressly permitted economically targeted
investments, the onerous requirements of continuous monitoring
and performance assessment 290 would further deter funds from in-
vesting in such projects. Generally, such monitoring serves an im-
portant purpose - allowing pension fund trustees to identify
underperforming assets and promptly dispose of them.29' With ec-
285. Lurie, supra note 27, at 350.
286. According to Lurie, such legislation should indicate at least five attributes of a
proper targeted investment:
(1) looking solely at economic merits, the investment is suitable for the plan;
(2) the purpose of the investment is to provide for the participants' plan
benefits;
(3) the social benefit, while not necessarily subordinate to the other primary
purpose of the investment, does not in any way compromise that purpose;
(4) the trustees clearly identify the social benefit;
(5) the targeted investment does not thwart, in any reasonably foreseeable
way, the participants receiving their plan benefits.
Lurie, supra note 27, at 340.
287. Supra part I(D)(3).
288. Supra note 17 and accompanying text; supra note 182 and accompanying text.
289. Iezman, supra note 82, at 20-21.
290. Id.
291. Glennie v. Abitibi-Price Corp., 912 F. Supp. 993, 1004 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
("When a fiduciary does receive negative information regarding a particular invest-
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onomically targeted investments, however, the effect could be ex-
actly the opposite. To avoid political repercussions, fund trustees
might not be willing to dispose of inadequately performing invest-
ments in in-state affordable housing projects, expressly or implic-
itly invoking social concerns as the justification for these decisions
at the expense of plan participants.
D. The Legality of Pension Fund Investments in Securities
Backed By Affordable Residential Real Estate
Equity and Mortgages.
Investments in securities backed by low-to-moderate income af-
fordable real estate can serve as a workable paradigm for targeted
investments in this sector. REITS specializing in investing in af-
fordable residential real estate in the states and regions targeted by
pension plans can accomplish this goal on the equity side, while
investments in mortgage-based securities collateralized by such
properties located in targeted regions would be the solution for
funds seeking investments on the debt side.
Targeted investments in securities backed by real estate would
resolve many concerns of pension fund trustees who want to pur-
sue developmental investment strategies. The main problem of
traditional targeted investments is the potential for the violation of
the exclusive benefit rule of ERISA and state statutes due to the
arbitrariness inherent in the process of selecting and continuously
monitoring such investments. 92 In contrast, investments in REIT
shares or MBS do not require pension funds to apply arbitrary cri-
teria to identify and close capital gaps. As in the case of mortgage-
backed securities, rating agencies like Standard & Poor's or
Moody's Investor,293 employing computer models to evaluate char-
acteristics of underlying properties, provide investors with an ob-
jective measure in the form of investment grade ratings. 294 The
high levels of accountability and disclosure required of security-
issuers would eliminate the arbitrariness in investment monitoring
accompanying direct investments by pension plans. By investing in
real estate securities, pension fund trustees can distance themselves
from political pressures associated with traditional targeted invest-
ment strategies.
ment in an ERISA plan, it is that fiduciary's duty to act prudently to protect, to the
extent possible, the plan from loss.").
292. Supra Part 111(C).
293. MADISON, supra note 64 at 809.
294. Id.
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However, more than just the creation of well-functioning local
secondary markets similar to those in single-family housing295 is re-
quired to attract pensions to developmental investment in low-to-
moderate income residential real estate. Because securities based
on a pool of multifamily mortgages without credit enhancement
will not be purchased,296 the federal and state governments need to
create new and expand existing credit-support and insurance pro-
grams to guarantee affordable multifamily loans.297 Furthermore,
the interpretation of the prohibited transactions rule and the pru-
dence requirement of ERISA needs to be extended to include a
wider range of real estate-backed securities, like the "B piece"
MBSs. 298 In view of recent decisions on the issue of the prudence
of pension fund investments in light of modern investment prac-
tices,299 courts are likely to uphold this approach.
CONCLUSION
Remedying the housing crisis plaguing the nation requires inno-
vative solutions. Although higher-end residential real estate in-
vestments attract much attention from both Main Street and Wall
Street, the demand for low-to-moderate income multifamily resi-
dential real estate sharply exceeds the supply. Much of this has to
do with the inefficiencies inherent in investing in this sector of real
estate, though the lack of financing is also a big factor. Pension
funds are well positioned to become a major investor in low-to-
moderate income multifamily residential real estate, while benefit-
ing their respective states and localities by improving the local
housing situation and creating jobs for local populations. How-
ever, the outdated regime of fiduciary regulations contained in ER-
ISA and state statutes significantly hampers active participation of
pension funds in developmental investment. The economically
targeted investment model has proven inadequate to accommodate
pension funds willing to engage in developmental investing. New
295. Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond The Boundaries Of the Community Reinvest-
ment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based Framework for
Generating Low and Moderate Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 754-58
(1996) (discussing the role of secondary mortgage purchasers, like Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, in financing single-family affordable housing).
296. Forte, supra note 80, at 492.
297. Id.
298. For a definition of a "B piece" MBS, see id. at 506. See also Claire A. Hill,
Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener For Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1070, 1126
n.131 (1996).
299. See supra parts I(D)(1)(a)-(b).
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legislation based on modern investment principles and reflecting
recent developments in the area of securitization of real estate is
required to stimulate pension fund investments in low and moder-
ate income residential real estate. As a result of such legislation,
pension funds would be able to contribute significantly to the eco-
nomic development of their respective states and to the improve-
ment of housing shortages while also protecting retirees' pension
funds.
